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Several	challenges	that	Obama	faced	in	his	first	four	years	in	office	remain	at	the	top	of	his	agenda.	
Yet,	the	circumstances	in	which	they	are	to	be	met	are	considerably	changed.	Obama’s	second	term	
foreign	policy	 is	suffering	from	a	number	of	domestic	and	 international	constraints:	The	American	
public	is	tired	of	war,	the	economic	slow‐down	leads	to	severe	cuts	on	defense	budget,	austerity	in	
Europe	is	negatively	affecting	NATO	international	commitment	and	Obama's	support	abroad	and	at	
home	is	lessened.	
This	paper	explores	how	 the	Obama	administration	 is	coping	with	 these	constraints.	 It	 focuses	on	
elements	 of	 evolution	 and	 continuity	 in	 U.S.	 foreign	 and	 security	 policies	 in	 four	 policy	 area:	 (a)	
strategic	 planning;	 (b)	 the	 strategic	 shift	 toward	Asia;	 (c)	mission	 in	 Afghanistan;	 and	 (d)	war	 on	
terrorism	and	the	use	of	drones.	
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Introduction 
President Obama’s re-election in November 2012 seemed to suggest that 
the U.S. foreign policy will follow the same patterns of his first term. 
However, the international environment has changed considerably in the 
last few years. Although several challenges that Obama faced at the 
beginning of his presidency remain at the top of his agenda they have 
changed or the circumstances in which they are to be met are different. 
Obama’s foreign and security policies in his second term rely on both new 
opportunities and constraints. After four years in office Barack Obama is 
far more experienced. The 2012 election results, with his clear and 
unexpected victory, gave him a renewed and stronger mandate on foreign 
policy. As he will not face another presidential campaign he gained more 
freedom in pursuing contentious policies. Although it is unlikely that he 
will cause problems for the new Democratic candidate, Obama benefits 
from a higher degree of autonomy. In other terms, Obama is now in a 
position to craft a more affirmative agenda. 
On the other hand, in his second term Obama is suffering from several 
domestic and external constraints. The American public is tired of war 
and the economic slowdown is leading to severe cuts to the defence budget. 
Both will limit his decisions about the use of force in the near future. 
Austerity is affecting American allies as well, particularly in Europe, and 
this will limit NATO’s international engagement. Obama’s support abroad 
has dramatically diminished compared with his first years in office and 
that has a negative effect on international perceptions of American 
leadership. Most of the challenges he faced in his first mandate are still 
unresolved: North Korea’s nuclear intent; the Iranian nuclear program; 
the peace process in Palestine; the problematic disengagement from 
Afghanistan. Meanwhile, new challenges have emerged in the aftermath 
of the Arab Spring, with a worsening Syrian crisis calling for an 
international solution with a clear U.S. commitment. 
This paper explores elements of evolution and continuity in U.S. foreign 
and security policies during Obama’s presidency looking at four policy 
areas: (a) strategic planning; (b) the strategic shift toward Asia; (c) the 
mission in Afghanistan; and (d) the war on terrorism and the use of 
drones1. 
 
                                                              
1 Other important issues, such as the Obama approach to the Iranian nuclear program 
and U.S. reactions to the Arab Spring, are addressed in other papers of this ISPI Study. 
See, respectively, C. CASTIGLIONI, Obama’s Policy toward Iran: Comparing First and 
Second Term and G. RANGWALA, Returning to the Middle East: The Second Term 
Amidst the Arab Uprisings. 
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US strategic planning in budget restriction times 
The main challenges on which the Obama administration has had to 
concentrate major efforts in its strategic planning were basically two. 
First, managing the end of the two wars inherited from the Bush 
administration, at the same time continuing a strong fight against  global 
terrorism; second, responding to an evolved international environment, 
dealing with budgetary constraints and fiscal uncertainties not 
comparable to those of any other previous presidency, at least not since 
the end of the Cold War. If the former has been a commitment forced by 
past choices and characterized by the administration’s pragmatic will to 
win the peace and bring the troops home, the latter has been an effort 
more future-oriented and for this reason it has more closely involved 
strategic planning. In fact, to minimize security risks – always present in 
whatever operations of cutting the defence-budget – the Pentagon has had 
to engage in a huge job of prioritizing the present and future global 
challenges to the safety of the US, determining the size and the missions 
of the armed forces in a way coherent with budget reductions. To evaluate 
the extent of this operation, we can analyse the Defence Strategic 
Guidance (DSG), that is, the main document that the DoD, in January of 
2012, issued specifically for this purpose2.  
More than other important strategic documents released by the Pentagon 
since 2008 (such as the QDR 2010), this guidance represented the heart of 
Obama’s strategic planning. In fact it was “a presidentially-endorsed, 
mid-term defence review”3 that accounted not only for the budgetary cuts 
(487 billion for the next ten years) mandated by the Budget Control Act of 
2011, but also for all the latest major developments in security 
environments, from the Arab Spring to the killing of Osama Bin Laden. 
For all these reasons, the new QDR scheduled for next year “should utilize 
the 2012 DSG as a point of departure”, probably without “undertak(ing) a 
comprehensive reassessment of defence priorities or the strategic 
landscape”4. From the analysis of this document, there are at least four 
main strategic highlights that we have to point out5. 
                                                              
2 US DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, Sustaining U.S. Global leadership. Priorities for 
21° Century Defense, Washington DC January 2012, available at 
http://www.defense.gov/news/Defense_Strategic_Guidance.pdf.  
3 See the report by C.A. MURDOCK - K. SAYLER, Preparing for the 2014 Quadrennial 
Defense Review, CSIS, March 2013, p. 5, available at http://csis.org/files/ 
publication/130319_Murdock_Preparing2014QDR_Web.pdf. 
4 Ibidem. 
5 For a more detailed list of priorities derived from the DSG, see the other document 
released by the Pentagon the same month of the guidance: U.S. DEPARTMENT OF 
DEFENSE, Defense Budget Priorities and Choices, Washington DC, January 2012, 
available at http://www.defense.gov/news/Defense_Budget_Priorities.pdf.  
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1. As evidenced even from the title of the guidance, renewing 
American global leadership remains the first fundamental objective 
stated. A primacy based firstly on an indisputable military 
superiority and on a network of alliances and partnerships all over 
the world: both must be maintained. This point clearly is not new; 
rather it has been a constant feature in grand US  strategies since 
the end of the Cold War. But it’s a useful remark to understand 
where Obama is positioned within the broad debate on the demise of 
uni-polarity (usually confused with the end of the US’ unilateral 
season). Put differently, the guidance is very clear in indicating that 
Obama’s rhetorical emphasis on multilateralism and his call for a 
prioritization of America’s global commitments doesn’t mean that 
Washington has given up on the role of global leader. Conversely, 
they indicate that now the US is looking more closely at sharing and 
making it costs more effective. 
2. The second highlight concerns the size and the main missions of the 
US armed forces: at least three recommendations deserve to be 
mentioned. 
 Accommodating the defence budget cuts, the US armed forces 
must become “smaller and leaner”, but at the same time more 
“agile, flexible, ready and technologically advanced”6. If the main 
reductions set out in the document will regard the Army and the 
Marine ground forces, the size of the Navy will not have to be 
affected: improving or at least maintaining unchanged 
capabilities in projecting power abroad, in fact, remains a top 
priority for US armed forces. The same exemption concerns the 
Special Operation Forces.  
 The US armed forces have to be planned and sized in order to “be 
capable of deterring and defeating aggression by an 
opportunistic adversary in one region even when our forces are 
committed to a large-scale operation elsewhere”7. Through this 
fundamental statement the Pentagon definitively goes beyond 
the traditional two war force-sizing approach that has 
characterized the American defence planning since the end of the 
Cold War. 
 Finally, with the sentence “the US forces will no longer be sized 
to conduct large-scale, prolonged stability operations”8, the DoD 
explicitly signalled the end of the season of nation-building 
missions. 
                                                              
6 Ibidem, p. 1. 
7 See the DSG, p. 4. 
8 Ibidem, p. 6. 
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3. The third complements the previous, setting the shifts in 
military-technological priorities consistently with the changes in 
US defence posture. The main claim is for “protecting key 
investments in the technologically advanced capabilities most 
needed for the future, including countering anti-access threats”9. 
Here the first reference is to the need to improve capabilities to 
defeat what planners, explicitly mentioning the cases of China and 
Iran, indicated as A2/AD (Area Denial/Anti-Access). More generally, 
the point regards the need to secure full freedom of access and 
maneuver throughout the global commons described as ever more 
contested - the free flow of goods shipped by air or sea; the 
cyber-sphere; the space environment10. 
4. The last, but absolutely not the least is the so-called Pivot towards 
the Asia-Pacific region. In the framework of this strategic shift the 
US will intensify its role in this ever-more strategic region, 
strengthening its traditional alliances and expanding its network of 
partnerships to other emerging regional actors. As Obama publicly 
stated: “the U.S. presence and mission in the Asia Pacific is a top 
priority […] and reductions in U.S. defence spending will not come 
at the expense of the Asia Pacific”11. 
Strategic shift to Asia-Pacific 
The launch of the Pacific Pivot was immediately accompanied by a large 
international debate. Such strong centrality given to  rebalancing to the 
Asia-Pacific region has, in fact, not only attracted the attention of US 
partners and rivals in Asia, but also alarmed US allies in other regions 
(above all Europe and the Middle-East), worried that the Pivot could mean 
a disengagement of Washington. Especially considering that it had been 
announced in a framework of budget cuts, which heightens the risk that 
the deployment of US troops abroad and related investments could 
become a zero-sum game between regions. 
If it is too early to say whether these concerns were well placed or not12, 
it's already possible try to figure out what kind of strategic change the 
                                                              
9 US DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, Defense Budget Priorities and Choices, p. 4. 
10 On the close link between American hegemony and control of the global commons, 
see the classic article of Barry POSEN, Command of the commons. The military 
foundation of U.S. hegemony, «International Security», vol. 28, no. 1, 2003, pp. 5-46. 
11Texts of remarks by President Obama to the Australian Parliament, November 17, 
2011, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/11/17/remarks- 
president-obama-australian-parliament.  
12 It is dutiful to point out that Obama, starting exactly from the DSG, has always 
reconfirmed that the Pivot will not affect the fulfillment of American commitments in 
all other regions. 
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Pivot has represented and how this change is linked with broader US 
hegemonic grand strategy. 
So, first we have to mention at least the following initiatives, all taken by 
the Obama Administration since the launch of the Pivot at the end of 
201113: the announcement of new troop deployments to Australia and new 
naval deployments to Singapore; the start of talks with the Philippines, 
Vietnam, Thailand and New Zealand for incrementing the areas of 
security-cooperation; a proposal for expanding the military-presence at 
and the functions of the Guam base; the signing of a new 
military-agreement with Japan14; the U.S.’ access to the East-Asia 
Summit; an acceleration in negotiations for the Trans-Pacific Partnership; 
the definitive conclusion of a free trade agreement with South Korea.  
As can be seen from this list, the rebalance strategy is composed of a 
strong military pillar, but it also includes a diplomatic and economic 
dimension. According to a scheme described by Hillary Clinton, “One of 
the most important tasks of American statecraft over the next decade will 
therefore be to lock in a substantially increased investment – diplomatic, 
economic, strategic, and otherwise – in the Asia-Pacific region”15. 
Underlining the multidimensional nature of the rebalance is particularly 
important to understanding its connection with the US global hegemonic 
strategy and in particular with rising competition in the region with 
China. But before analysing this connection, still to be noted is another 
basic feature of the Pivot: in many aspects it represents an expansion 
rather than a transformation of US policy in the region16. The military 
presence and the economical and political commitment of the US in this 
region are, in fact, some of the most constant features in American foreign 
policy since the end of the Second World War: Washington has been 
engaged in Asia-Pacific for sixty years. 
So, what has really changed in the last few years is the geopolitical 
centrality of this region within the new American strategic horizon. 
Especially if compared to the paradigm of the global war on terror, which 
strongly focused on the so-called Greater Middle East. Furthermore, 
compared to the strategic planning of the past decade (until the QDR 
2010), the Pivot also represents a remarkable return to a more traditional 
                                                              
13 For a more detailed list see CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, op cit. pp. 
1-5. 
14  The agreement, signed on 3 October 2013, is basically on the positioning of 
surveillance drones in Japan. See this article: http://www.nytimes. 
com/2013/10/04/world/asia/japan-and-us-agree-to-broaden-military-alliance.html 
15 See H. CLINTON, America’s Pacific Century, in «Foreign Policy», November 2011. 
16  For deepening the new and old aspects in the Pivot see CONGRESSIONAL 
RESEARCH SERVICE, op. cit. 
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vision of international dynamics, where the most important challenges 
and the most dangerous causes of international instability arise from the 
changes in power of states and regions, rather than from the threatening 
activity of non-state actors or from the weakness of failed states. 
From this perspective we can read the Pivot as a US response to three 
major underlying dynamics that Washington has recognized as potential 
sources of destabilization for its own international hegemony.  
1. The first dynamic is about the rising power imbalance between 
world regions and so, in the framework of US hegemonic strategy, 
this commits the United States to the Asia-Pacific as a whole: a 
process to which the IR literature usually refers in speaking about 
the transition of power from West to East. In this sense, 
Washington has just acknowledged that the new economic 
centrality of Asia-Pacific needs a consequent shift of its power 
investment toward it. And considering the unbreakable link 
between economic and security interests of a capitalistic power like 
the US, if Americans want to remain at the top of the international 
hierarchy of power and prestige, they will have to concentrate their 
main efforts on this ever-more crucial region. Said in one sentence: 
given the increasing value of Asia-Pacific, US hegemony must 
become less Atlantic and more Pacific. 
2. The second dynamic, hardly stated publicly and despite Clinton’s 
call for an increased US-China cooperation17, concerns the potential 
for conflict between a global hegemon like the United States, 
basically interested in maintaining the status quo, and a rising 
regional power like China, that in the near future could pursue a 
revisionist agenda18. From this point of view, the military 
dimension of the Pivot responds to a typical hegemonic strategy to 
prevent the emergence of a potential regional rival.  
3. For the last source of instability, we have to look at the political 
dynamics within the Asia-Pacific region. The remarkable rise of 
China’s economy on the one hand, and the traditionally strong 
military presence of U.S. on the other is, in fact, creating a 
progressive disjunction in this region between the economic centre 
of gravity and its strategic one. This trend deeply impacts on all 
other regional actors, creating a divergence between their economic 
interests that converge on Beijing and their military choices that 
remain in the American orbit. It’s enough to note that China in the 
                                                              
17 Ibidem. 
18For a theoretical framework of the dialectic between status-quo and revisionist 
powers, see R. GILPIN, War and Change in International Politics, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge 1981. 
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last years has become the first trading partner of Japan, Australia 
and South Korea, which have been the three key-partners in the 
Asian security strategy of the US since the fifties. And it’s exactly to 
reduce this new trade-off that Washington has focused its efforts 
not only on the military dimension but also on renewing its 
economic initiative.  
Afghanistan: Obama’s war 
While labelling the war in Iraq as unnecessary, President Obama has 
made the military intervention in Afghanistan his central front in the war 
on terror. Accordingly, he has invested enormously in a new strategic 
approach fostering a new phase of international intervention. The path 
from his first term to the second has marked a huge shift starting from a 
surge of troops to a planned withdrawal. 
During his first term there were a number of reviews of policy in 
Afghanistan. Immediately after he took office, in March 2009, Obama 
adopted the so-called Af-Pak Strategy. The first sharpest break from his 
predecessor was the idea of including Pakistan in the overall strategic 
approach to Afghanistan. Obama, in his speech presenting the new 
strategy, argued that “the ability of extremists in Pakistan to undermine 
Afghanistan is proven, while insurgency in Afghanistan feeds instability 
in Pakistan”19. The distancing from the previous understanding of the 
U.S. alliance with Pakistan was consistent with a more general approach 
to the war on terror in Central Asia. In fact, President Obama opted for a 
more targeted and less ideological strategy in Afghanistan focusing chiefly 
on two core goals: defeating al-Qaeda and preventing safe havens in 
Afghanistan and Pakistan20. 
In December 2009 Obama announced a troop surge, which took place in 
2010, but he also announced that the troops would draw down starting 
from July 2011. At the same time Obama prompted a huge revision in U.S. 
strategy, adopting a counter-insurgency approach.  In November 2010, at 
the NATO Lisbon Summit, the U.S. and its European allies adopted a 
plan of gradual withdrawal to be concluded by the end of 2014. In Lisbon 
and in the following NATO Chicago Summit (May 2012), NATO allies and 
the Afghan government agreed on a process called Transition, a 
progressive shift of the responsibility for security from international 
                                                              
19 Obama's Strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan, March 2009 http://www.cfr.org/ 
pakistan/obamas-strategy-afghanistan-pakistan-march2009/p18952?breadcrumb=%2
Fpublication%2Fby_type%2Fessential_document. 
20 See the White Paper of the Interagency Policy Group's Report on U.S. Policy toward 
Afghanistan and Pakistan, march 2009, http://www.whitehouse.gov/assets/documents/ 
Afghanistan-Pakistan_White_Paper.pdf. 
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troops to the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). The surge peak of 
100,000 U.S. troops was reached in mid 2011, while in June President 
Obama announced a decrease of 10,000 by the end of the year and a 
further pull-out of 23,000 by the end of 2012. Finally, in February 2013, he 
stated that the U.S. military presence in Afghanistan would decrease by 
another 34,000 troops, leaving about 33,000 troops by February 201421. 
To put it briefly, if Obama’s first mandate was the term of the surge, the 
second is going to be that of the withdrawal. The first was the time of  
renewed engagement, the second will be that of departure. The U.S. role 
in Afghanistan after 2015 will remain considerable: the two countries 
signed the U.S.-Afghan Strategic Partnership Agreement in May 2012, 
they are negotiating the terms of U.S. military presence after 2015, and 
NATO is setting up its post-2014 mission Resolute Support in 
Afghanistan22. Beyond the civilian mission, the key element of the U.S. 
and NATO presence will be training, advising and assisting the ANSF. 
However, the withdrawal of international combat troops will ultimately 
leave the responsibility for security in Afghan hands and the challenge for 
the Obama Administration is to accurately cope with the risks of 
international disengagement. 
The results of President Obama’s policy in Afghanistan are mixed. The 
situation slightly improved in 2011 and 2012, the surge of troops and the 
extensive use of drones put the Taliban on the defensive. International 
troop casualties due to enemy attacks have constantly declined since 2011, 
although that was not just an effect of the surge but mainly a consequence 
of the troop decrease and the leading role that ANSF are taking in combat 
operations23. The very fact that ANSF casualties are constantly increasing 
is an indication that the Transition process is on track but also that the 
insurgency’s strength remains considerable. 
                                                              
21 For Obama’s decisions about U.S. policy in Afghanistan see CATHERINE DALE, 
War in Afghanistan: Campaign Progress, Political Strategy, and Issues for Congress, 
Congressional Research Service, CRS Report for Congress, August 29, 2013, 
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R43196.pdf. 
22 NATO Allies and partners stress support for Afghan Security Forces, 23 October, 
2013, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_104252.htm. 
23 U.S. Department of Defense, Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan, 
Report to Congress, July 2013, http://www.defense.gov/pubs/Section_1230_Report_ 
July_2013.pdf. 
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Although the ANSF are now in the lead in conducting military operations 
against the insurgents – thanks to a relatively successful process of 
transition – they are not entirely autonomous yet. They lack intelligence 
and airpower capabilities and ethnic divisions within the military still 
limit cohesion and coordination24. Thus, it’s still hard to predict how they 
will cope with the Taliban insurgency after the international military 
departure. Since the prospect of stability in Afghanistan after 2014 will 
dramatically depend on ANSF’s capacity to contain the Taliban, the 
successfulness of Obama’s policy for the time being is a matter of 
probability. Stephen Biddle summarized the point as follows: “the surge 
made important progress, but the tight deadlines for a U.S. withdrawal 
and the Taliban’s resilience have left insurgents in control of enough 
territory to remain military viable well after 2014. Afghan government 
forces will thus inherit a more demanding job than expected”25. 
In short, Obama’s policy toward Afghanistan, in his first years in office, 
initiated a considerable strategic change but one that has not brought 
about the expected outcomes. In 2009 he promised a withdrawal from 
Afghanistan as a corollary to new engagement. The surge of troops would 
not be an open-ended policy but a temporary venture. That was all that 
Americans could accept. To a certain extent he designed his second term 
policy in Afghanistan during his first year at the White House, even 
though the effects of his new strategy were hardly predictable in 2009. 
Terrorism and the war of drones 
From the outset President Obama set up a new course in the war on 
terror. His approach in fighting terrorism has been both more focused and 
more ethical. From a strategic perspective he has stressed the idea of 
fighting only the necessary wars, avoiding a disproportionate use of force 
at a global level. He considered the war in Iraq an unnecessary war and at 
the same time he declared the war in Afghanistan the top priority on 
which the U.S. should invest more. Barack Obama also promised greater 
ethical integrity than his predecessor. He vowed to end the use of torture 
and close the detention facility in Guantanamo. Throughout his 
presidency, Obama maintained that in protecting U.S. citizens, 
domestically and abroad, America must respect its core values. 
                                                              
24 See A. CARATI, Il futuro dell’Afghanistan. La gestione della sicurezza nelle mani 
delle forze di sicurezza afgane, ISPI Analysis no. 58, luglio 2011 and C. DALE, War in 
Afghanistan…,  cit. 
25 S. BIDDLE, Ending the War in Afghanistan, in «Foreign Affairs», September/October 
2013. 
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Most notably, the point at which effectiveness and moral standards 
collided has been the use of drones. The targeted killing of suspected 
terrorists by unmanned drones turned out to be a particularly effective 
tool but, on the other hand, elicited a number of ethical and juridical 
controversies. If Obama’s approach in fighting terrorism has really been 
different from his predecessor’s and constant throughout his presidency, 
the war of drones marked the most significant evolution in his policy 
decisions. 
George W. Bush oversaw 45 drone strikes – all carried out in Pakistan – 
while Obama is estimated to have overseen a further 308 in Pakistan and 
a number of other strikes in Yemen, Somalia, Afghanistan and in Libya 
during NATO’s intervention26. The increasing use of drones between 
administrations and during the Obama presidency is not just the effect of 
technological improvements. Obama has made one of the U.S.’ 
counter-terrorism capabilities a predominant method in his war against 
al-Qaeda. In other words, in Obama’s use of drones “there has been a clear 
policy shift towards reliance on target killing”27. 
The evolution from a cautious reliance on drones to a clear commitment to 
their implementation as a central tool against terrorism is proven by the 
initial reluctance to talk openly about the use of drones. During his first 
three years in office President Obama did little to publicly admit his policy 
on targeted killing in Pakistan and other countries28. Only in early 2012 
did he publicly claim the effectiveness of that policy. Thereafter the 
administration showed an increasing willingness to reveal details about 
drone attacks against suspected terrorist. 
The more the use of drones has become public knowledge the more it has 
fed the debate over the ethical, legal and political implications of targeted 
killing. Many contend the moral legitimacy of the targeted killing of 
suspected individuals: there is a grey zone about how the “black list” is 
compiled and how the necessary information required to decide to kill a 
suspected terrorist is acquired; unmanned drones have caused a number 
of civilian casualties; and the use of drones is devoid of transparency and 
public support. 
Also from a legal standpoint the use of drones is controversial. Targeted 
killing not always responds to an imminent threat to U.S. citizens or 
                                                              
26 P. BERGEN - K. TIEDEMANN, The Year of the Drone, Counterterrorism Strategy 
Initiative Policy Paper – New America Foundation, 24 February  2010. For recent data 
over drone strikes in Pakistan see the New American Foundation dataset: 
http://natsec.newamerica.net/drones/pakistan/analysis (latest access on 18 November 
2013). 
27 T. McCRISKEN, Obama’s Drone War, in «Survival», vol. 55, no. 2, pp. 97-122, p. 97. 
28 Ibidem, p. 98. 
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soldiers. It violates the sovereignty of countries that are not at war with 
the U.S. – i.e. Pakistan. Several jurists consider the Department of Justice 
White Paper about the administration’s current policy on the use of drones 
contradictory and unsatisfactory29. 
From a political point of view, the Obama administration is still not clear 
about the decision-making behind the targeted killing. Recently the role of 
the Pentagon was better clarified but the CIA’s involvement is still 
ambiguous. We know that the White House has given a trigger role to CIA 
officials over drone strikes in Pakistan, but, as Trevor McKrisken noted, 
“it is unclear who was involved in targeting decisions, what criteria were 
being applied and whether the discussions considered the merits of killing 
rather than capturing targets”30. 
Despite its assumed efficacy the use of drones has met some criticism from 
a strategic perspective too. Some argue that the usefulness of drones from 
a tactical viewpoint is outweighed by the detrimental consequences on 
public opinion and popular support for international troops, particularly 
in Afghanistan and Pakistan31. In addition, as Daniel Byman pointed out, 
killing rather than capturing limits intelligence gathering since deprives 
the counterterrorism forces of information resulting from interrogations32. 
Notwithstanding these objections Obama has strongly defended his 
programme, as proven by the appointment as CIA director of John 
Brennan, one of the most influential advocates of the expansion of drone 
policy. The first and foremost reason to retain such a controversial policy 
is effectiveness. Unmanned drones are accurate, their remote nature 
keeps U.S. officers away from risk, they can avoid risky ground military 
campaigns and, to a certain extent, they minimize civilian casualties. But 
efficacy is not all and cannot overshadow ethical, legal and political 
considerations. 
Obama in his speech at the National Defence University in May 2013, 
defended his drone policy even in the face of ethical and legal criticism33. 
From an ethical point of view, considering the collateral civilian 
                                                              
29 See the debate about the Department of Justice “White Paper” on the US News 
website: http://www.usnews.com/debate-club/has-obama-gone-too-far-with-his-drone 
-policies.  
30 T. McCRISKEN, Obama’s Drone War…, cit., p. 101. 
31 D. KILCULLEN – A.M. EXUM, Death from above, Outrage down below, in «The New 
York Times», 16 May 2009. 
32 D. BYMAN, Do Targeted Killings Work?, Brooking Institute, 13 July 2009, 
http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2009/07/14-targeted-killings-byman. 
33 Obama’s Speech on Drone Policy, transcript of President Obama’s speech on U.S. 
drone and counter-terror policy, in «The New York Times», 23 May 2013, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/24/us/politics/transcript-of-obamas-speech-on-drone-p
olicy.html?pagewanted=1&_r=1. The following quotations are part of this transcript. 
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casualties, he stressed the increasing precision of targeted killings. He 
argued that, although regrettable, civilian casualties are part of every war 
and, most important, since terrorist plots have been disrupted “these 
strikes saved lives” both where U.S. troops are combating and at home. 
From a legal standpoint, Obama contended that “America’s actions are 
legal  […]. Under domestic law, and international law, the United States 
is at war with al Qaeda, the Taliban, and their associated forces.  We are 
at war with an organization that right now would kill as many Americans 
as they could if we did not stop them first.  So this is a just war – a war 
waged proportionally, in last resort, and in self-defence”. 
Whether President Obama has been convincing in rejecting criticism of 
the use of drones is still not clear. What is clear now is that he set up a 
policy that has become a centrepiece of U.S. counterterrorism strategy and 
that his successors can hardly dismiss. 
Conclusions 
President Obama’s second term seems to be moving along the path of his 
first term. The four policy areas examined in the paper reveal both 
continuity and change. The former, to a certain degree, outweighs the 
second. Preservation of America’s international leadership, defence of the 
global commons and a strategic interest in the Asia-Pacific region are not 
new themes for his second mandate – as they are not new in U.S. foreign 
policy history. The Obama administration has basically reframed them in 
the light of two new structural constraints: limitation of the defence 
budget and the redistribution of international power toward Asia. 
Yet Obama’s second term is showing some changes in Afghanistan and, 
particularly, in the use of drones. Most likely, after a renewed engagement 
in his first four years in office, his second term will be denoted by the U.S. 
departure from Afghanistan. And even more strikingly, Obama’s 
approach to the war on terror, which was initially marked by a high moral 
stance, will be remembered for his tough policy shift toward reliance on 
drones. 
